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SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DMSION
THIRD DEPARTMENT
People v. Couserl
(decided July 9, 1999)
Defendant John Couser was charged with felony murder in the
first degree under Penal Law § 125.27(1)(a)(vii)2 after ordering the
execution of a witness scheduled to testify against him.3 In a pre-
trial motion, the defendant moved to dismiss the second count of
an eighteen count indictment on the ground that the statutory
limitation on accomplice liability, namely that the defendant
"commanded" another to cause the death of the victim, is
unconstitutionally vague under the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution4 or
Article I, Section 65 of the Constitution of the State of New York.6
The Appellate Division, Fourth Department, reversed the decision
of the Onondaga County Court, which had granted the dismissal,7
and held that in a noncapital murder case, due process merely
requires that the clause be sufficiently definite to serve as the
statutory definition of a crime.8 In dismissing any legislative
ambiguity, the Court stressed that "[i]f the actions of the defendant
[ ] are plainly within the ambit of the statute, the court will not
'People v. Couser, 258 A.D.2d 74, 695 N.Y.S.2d 781 (4th Dep't, 1999).
2 N.Y. Penal Law § 125.27(1)(a)(vii) (McKinney 1998). Clause (vii) provides
in pertinent part: "the defendant's criminal liability under this subparagraph is
based upon the defendant having commanded another person to cause the death
of the victim or intended victim pursuant to section 20.00. Id.
' Couser, 258 A.D.2d at 75, 695 N.Y.S.2d at 783 (4th Dep't, 1999).
4 U.S. Const. amend. XIV. The Fourteenth Amendment provides in pertinent
part: "No State shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
the due process of law." Id.
5 N.Y. Const. art. I, § 6. This section provides in pertinent part: "No person
shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law." Id.
6 Couser, 258 A.D.2d at 76, 695 N.Y.S.2d at 783.
7 People v. Couser, 176 Misc. 2d 101, 674 N.Y.S.2d 887 (Onondaga County
Ct. 1998).
' Couser, 258 A.D.2d at 76, 695 N.Y.S.2d at 785. "The issue, however, is
not whether that clause is sufficiently definite to serve as an aggravating factor
establishing eligibility for the death penalty. The issue is whether that clause
is sufficiently definite to serve as the statutory definition of a crime." Id.
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strain to imagine marginal situations in which the application of
the statute is not so clear."
9
The charges arose out of the execution-style murder of Virginia
Hackett and the non-fatal shooting of children John Paul Jones and
Eugene Jones.' 0 Gang member John Stanback allegedly was
summoned to the Rochester jail where gang leader, defendant
Couser, was incarcerated on robbery and attempted murder
charges. Defendant Couser allegedly directed Stanback to murder
James Hackett and supplied information necessary to carry out the
task." The intended victim reportedly was targeted because he
was scheduled to testify that defendant Couser had attempted to
kill him on a prior occasion. 12 On February 23, 1997, Stanback
and other "hit squad" members went to James Hackett's Syracuse
home intending to kill him. Finding only the elderly woman and
the two young children, Stanback nevertheless shot each of them
with a bullet to the head.
13
In his pre-trial motion, the defendant argued that the "command"
allegedly given to Stanback was limited to killing James Hackett
and did not encompass the victims. 14 While not addressing itself
directly to the merits of this argument, the trial court found that
"neither the legislature nor the courts have given any guidance
about what constitutes a 'command' under this statute."' 5 The trial
court declared that the indistinguishable boundaries on the
culpability language of Penal Law § 20.00, specifically "solicits,
requests, commands, importunes, or intentionally aids,"'16 do not
give value to the limiting provision of § 125.27(l)(a)(vii),' 7 and
thus render the statute impermissibly vague.18
9 Id., quoting People v. Nelson, 69 N.Y.2d 302, 308.
10 Couser, 176 Misc. 2d at 87, 674 N.Y.S.2d at 887.
11 Id.
12 Id.
13 Couser, 258 A.D.2d at 76, 695 N.Y.S.2d at 783.
14 Couser, 176 Misc. 2d at 87, 674 N.Y.S.2d at 888.
'5 Id. at 88, 674 N.Y.S.2d at 889.
16 N.Y. Penal Law § 20.00 (McKinney 1998). Accessory liability under
§ 20.00 is criminal where one person, acting with the mental culpability
required, either "solicits, requests, commands, importunes, or intentionally
aids" another person to engage in offensive conduct. Id.
17 N.Y. Penal Law § 125.27(1)(a)(vii) (McKinney 1998). Under
§ 125.27(1)(a)(vii), the class of death eligible defendants is limited to those
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The Appellate Court began its analysis by pointing out that both
the United States Supreme Court and Congress have made
distinctions in accomplice liability between those who are
unwilling parties to a felony murder and those who are "major
participants." 19 In Tison v. Arizona,20 the Supreme Court upheld
the imposition of the death penalty where the defendant was not
the principal shooter but was a major participant in the underlying
felony.2 1 Similarly, the restrictive language imposed by Congress
in drafting 21 USC § 848(e)(1)(B)' indicated that the death
penalty was to be reserved for those codefendants who acted as
"boss accomplices" by ordering the execution of any Federal,
State, or local law enforcement officer.23  The recognition,
therefore, of the codefendant as death eligible when distinguished
by the degree of culpability, has found acceptance in both legal
jurisprudence and legislative policy.
Here, the People argued, and the Court agreed, that the lower
court erred24 in applying an Eighth Amendment analysis to clause
(vii) since the prosecutor in this case "allowed the statutory 120-
day period to elapse without filing a notice of intent to seek the
who have "commanded another person to cause the death of the victim or
intended victim pursuant to section 20.00." Id.
's Couser, 176 Misc. 2d at 92, 674 N.Y.S.2d at 891.
19 Couser, 258 A.D.2d at 77, 695 N.Y.S.2d at 784 (stating "[a] person who
participates in a felony murder by commanding the death of the victim clearly
qualifies as a major participant in that crime." Id.
20 481 U.S. 137 (1987).
271 Couser, 258 A.D.2d at 77, 695 N.Y.S.2d at 784. "The Court stated that
the death penalty is an appropriate penalty for someone who is a major
participant in the underlying felony and who acts with reckless indifferenced to
human life." Id. (citing Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 158 (1987).
2221 U.S.C.A. § 848(e)(1)(B) provides in pertinent part:
[A]ny person, during the commission of, in furtherance of, or while attempting
to avoid apprehension, prosecution or service of a prison sentence for, a felony
... who intentionally kills or counsels, commands, induces, procures, or
causes the intentional killing of any Federal, State, or local law enforcement
officer ... may be sentenced to death.
2 Couser, 258 A.D.2d at 78, 695 N.Y.S.2d at 785. See Serr, "Of Crime and
Punishment, Kingpins and Footsoldiers, Life and Death: The Drug War and
the Federal Death Penalty Provision - Problems of Interpretation and
Constitutionality," 25 Ariz. St. L.J. 895, 909 (1993).
24 Couser, 258 A.D.2d at 78, 695 N.Y.S.2d at 785.
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death penalty. ' 5 Thus, while § 125.27 may define eligibility for a
death sentence, heightened scrutiny of the aggravating factors as
required under Holman v. Page 2 6 is not applicable to this
defendant. The vagueness argument, when correctly measured
under a due process standard, necessarily fails because clause (vii)
is sufficient as a statutory definition of a crime.
2 7
Since the federal requirements of due process parallel those in
Article I, Section 6 of the New York State Constitution, the
Appellate Court limited its analysis to those requirements
established by New York caselaw in People v. Bright28 . In
satisfying the first of the two-prong test for due process, the notice
requirement, the Court found that "a person of ordinary
intelligence" would be put on notice by § 125.27(l)(a)(vii) that "it
is a crime of the highest magnitude to participate in a felony
murder by commanding the death of the victim.'
29
The second due process requirement, that the statute be resistant
to arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement, is deemed satisfied
despite the defendant's argument that the term "command" is
indistinguishable from the other § 20.00 terms of "solicit,"
"request," or "importune." Without a more objective standard, the
defendant claims, jurors are left to indiscriminately apply their
personal definition of the term to the defendant's acts.
30
Rejecting the likelihood of any capricious interpretation, the
Court found stability in the common sense meaning of the word
"command" as defined by Webster's Dictionary: 3 1 "to direct
' Couser, 258 A.D.2d at 76, 695 N.Y.S.2d at 783.
26 95 F.3d 481, 487 (7th Cir. 1996).
27 Couser, 258 A.D.2d at 81, 695 N.Y.S.2d at 787.
28 71 N.Y.2d 376, 520 N.E.2d 1355, 526 N.Y.S.2d 66 (1988). In holding that
Penal Law § 240.35(7) which forbids loitering, was unconstitutionally vague,
the Court of Appeals stated that:
In a challenge to the constitutionality of a penal law on the grounds of
vagueness, it is well settled that a two-pronged analysis is required. First, the
statute must provide sufficient notice of what conduct is prohibited; second,
the statute must not be written in such a manner as to permit or encourage
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.
Id.
29 Couser, 258 A.D.2d at 81, N.Y.S.2d at 787.
10 Id.
11 Webster's Ninth New International Dictionary 264 (1983).
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authoritatively," i.e., "to give an order or orders." 2 While the
Court cautioned that "[t]he fact that there may be situations where
the line between a command and, for example, a solicitation is
blurred does not render the clause unconstitutionally vague,"
33
such was not the case here. The acts attributed to the defendant
clearly comported with the definition provided. The prosecution
successfully established proof that Stanback was summoned to the
jail, that the defendant instructed Stanback to "take care" of
Hackett's family, and that Stanback thereafter informed others of
his plans and motives. "That evidence, if believed, establishes that
defendant did not merely request, solicit, or importune someone to
kill the complainant but acted as a boss-accomplice to order a
member of his gang to commit the crime."
34
Further support for reversing the trial court's decision was found
in the judicial obligation to accord any statute a strong presumption
of constitutionality.3 5  "All statutes, even statutes establishing
crimes punishable by death," the Court informed, "are presumed to
be constitutional."3  In People v. Cruz,37 the Court of Appeals
expanded upon this obligation by directing that the plain meaning
of a statute be typically embraced,38 particularly when the
legislature has offered no indication that an alternative meaning
was intended.39
The strong language of the Court's opinion suggests that the
proper procedural approach, when interpreting a statute in a
noncapital case, is to begin with a presumption of constitutionality
and then charge each relative term with its commonly understood
meaning.4 0  Straining for a different interpretation absent the
necessity of a heightened scrutiny analysis would be construed as
overreaching on the part of the judiciary.
' Couser at 81, 695 N.Y.S.2d at 787.
33 Id.
: id.
I Couser at 81, 695 N.Y.S.2d at 786.
3 6 
id.
3748 N.Y.2d 419, 423 N.Y.S.2d 625, 399 N.E.2d 513 (1979).
3 1 Id. at 428, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 629, 399 N.E.2d at 517.
31 Couser, 258 A.D.2d at 80, 695 N.Y.S.2d at 786 (citing People v. Cruz, 48
N.Y.2d 419, 428, 423 N.Y.S.2d 625, 399 N.E.2d 513 (1979)).
o Couser, 258 A.D.2d at 80, 695 N.Y.S.2d at 786.
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Ironically, the Fourth Department rejected the lower court's
decision yet removed the statute from a capital punishment
analysis by borrowing from the "individualized sentencing"
principles referenced by the lower court 4' in Gregg v. Georgia.42
While § 125.27(1)(a) offers a list of aggravating circumstances
warranting the death penalty (thus potentially subjecting the statute
to heightened scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment), the specific
character of the case (the fact that the prosecution did not seek the
death penalty, only the alternative sentence of life in prison)
reduced the analysis to one of due process. Guided by the test laid
out in People v. Bright,43 the plain meaning of the word
"command" when measured against this particular defendant's
conduct, supported a finding that the statute was not subject to
arbitrary interpretation but rather was constitutionally valid under
Article I, Section 6 of the New York Constitution or the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution.
In conclusion, under the United States and New York State
constitutional due process requirements of notice and resistance to
arbitrary enforcement, the limitation on accomplice liability as set
forth in clause (vii) of New York Penal Law § 125.27(1)(a) is not
4' Couser, 176 Misc. 2d at 91, 674 N.Y.S.2d at 891.
42 428 U.S. 153, 198 (1976) (upholding Georgia's sentencing procedures
which require as a prerequisite to the imposition of the death penalty, specific
jury findings as to the circumstances of the crime or the character of the
defendant).
4371 N.Y.2d 376, 382, 526 N.Y.S.2d 66, 70, 520 N.E.2d 1355, 1358 (1988).
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vague or indefinite when applied as a statutory definition of a
crime in a noncapital murder case.
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